

## Influences of German Idealism on nineteenth-century architectural theory: Schelling and Leo von Klenze

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### I.

In nineteenth-century Germany, architectural thought was ‘subject to profoundly heterogeneous influences; philosophy and aesthetics took a novel and decisive position with regard to architecture, and this was reflected in theory’.<sup>1</sup> The source of the decisive influence of philosophy on contemporary architectural theory can be found in the Berlin Academy of Architecture, which was the most significant institution for the training of future architects in the German-speaking world. The key figure was Friedrich Gilly (1772–1800), who lectured at the Academy on optics and perspective. His father, David Gilly (1748–1808), had founded the Academy in 1799 and was primarily interested in the technical and constructive aspects of architecture.<sup>2</sup> He was therefore ideologically closer to the Paris *École polytechnique*, which specialised in engineering, than to the aesthetically oriented *École des beaux-arts*.

Friedrich Gilly, in his essay ‘Some Thoughts on the Necessity of Endeavouring to Unify the Various Departments of Architecture in Both Theory and Practice’ (1799),<sup>3</sup> offers a veiled criticism of the exclusive focus on construction technology in the Academy of Architecture, whose curriculum was directed towards the Prussian Government’s building programme, and was therefore hardly appropriate to the remit of an architecture of ideas.<sup>4</sup> He argues for technical-aesthetic integrity in the training of future architects, and to this end invokes the philosopher Karl Heinrich Heydenreich (1764–1801) on the justification of architecture as a type of art that is both independent and necessary for man’s aesthetic cultivation. For Heydenreich, this presupposed the unambiguous inclusion of architecture in the system of fine arts. Such a status was allowed to architecture only with qualifications,

because of the mechanical and functional elements peculiar to it. Its antithesis was seen to be poetry. Since, in terms of what it is possible to conceive, imagination knows no limits, poetry usually occupied the highest position in the contemporary system of the arts.<sup>5</sup> The worthlessness of architecture was vociferously emphasised by art historians such as Christian Ludwig Stieglitz (1756–1836) and Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–79).<sup>6</sup>

In his essay, Gilly used a quotation from Heydenreich's article 'A New Conception of Architecture as a Fine Art' to voice his opposition to this view:<sup>7</sup> the architect, Heydenreich said, is constrained by the 'physical' and 'relative'<sup>a</sup> purpose of the building, but not to such a degree 'that a field does not remain for his inspiration within which he can choose the forms according to his own ideas'. When he 'succeeds in giving his buildings such forms that the notion of a physical purpose entirely disappears and the spectator is uplifted . . . by its appearance to a freer play of related images, then his work is a work of fine art' and 'the inventive architect finds himself almost in one accord with the inventive poet'.<sup>b</sup> Thus, Heydenreich promotes architecture not simply to the status of a fine art, but even to a certain equality with poetry, which led to an enormously positive re-evaluation of architecture, and its recognition as an instrument of aesthetic cultivation.

Gilly's approach reflects not only a new self-confidence among architects within the community of artists, but also a new self-confidence in the arts generally, particularly in their relationship with scholarship. Peter Burke described the time around 1800 'as a magical moment of equilibrium'<sup>8</sup> between these two cultures. Part of the background to this is the notion of 'knowledge . . . as an organism'.<sup>9</sup> Karl Friedrich Burdach's *The Organism of Human Knowledge and Art* is the paradigm of this concept.<sup>10</sup> In his book, Burdach makes plain that art was increasingly deserving of a place in the system of knowledge, which was at this time in a state of flux, principally represented by two tendencies: on the one hand, the unity of professional and humanistic education promoted by Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer (1766–1848); and, on the other hand, Friedrich Meineke's (1862–1953) stress on the

a. 'Physische[n]'; 'verhältnismäßigen'. Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, 'Neuer Begriff der Baukunst als schoener Kunst', *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, 3, H. 10, 160–4, 162.

b. 'dass nicht eine seinem Genie freye Sphäre für die Erfindung offen bliebe, innerhalb welcher er nach seinem Gefühle die Formen wählen darf'; 'gelingt, seinem Gebäude solche Formen zu geben, daß der Gedanke des physischen Zweckes ganz verschwindet und der Betrachter sogleich durch den Anblick [. . .] erhoben, und zu einem freyern Spiele unter Bildern, die mit ihm zusammenhängen, begeistert wird, dann ist sein Werk ein Werk der schönen Kunst'; 'der erfindende Architekt befindet sich mit dem erfindenden Dichter in ziemlich gleicher Stimmung'. *Ibid.*, 162f.

temporal process.<sup>11</sup> Larry Shiner speaks of the ‘invention of art’,<sup>12</sup> which took on an increasingly independent existence through art criticism and the institution of the salon, but which also claimed for itself a role as a crucial component in the overall development of society and culture.

Within philosophy, aesthetics developed as an independent object of knowledge, as can be seen above all, in the writings of Alexander Baumgarten (1712–62) and Kant. Art was promoted in this context to a ‘form of knowledge’.<sup>13</sup> This combination of art and science (*Wissenschaft*) is also found in the charter of the Munich Academy of Fine Art (Münchner Akademie der schönen Künste), whose first general secretary was Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854). The charter states that art is ‘scientific’ (*wissenschaftlich*) and a ‘powerful means of education’.<sup>14</sup> Art students were required to undertake a course in philosophy and aesthetics as part of their training, which created a whole new approach to education. By the end of the eighteenth century, academies of art, whose graduates also received a conceptual and theoretical education, were increasingly being established to replace practical education in artists’ workshops.<sup>15</sup>

Gilly’s work at the Berlin Academy of Architecture is to be understood in this context, and it was not without influence on his contemporaries. There are many contemporary indications of this, both directly and indirectly associated with the Berlin Academy. They include, for example, links between the architects Karl Friedrich Schinkel (1781–1841) and Ludwig Friedrich (Louis) Catel (1778–1856) and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, as well as those between the architect Leo von Klenze (1784–1864) and Schelling. Schinkel and Klenze were graduates of the Academy, and had studied under Friedrich Gilly. While Klenze became the most important architect in Bavaria, the same is true of Schinkel in Prussia. Catel worked in the environment of the Berlin Academy.

The reasons for the links between these architects and philosophy range from formulations of the fundamental principles of architectural theory to justifications of a particular, individual practice selected from the various currents within early historicism.<sup>16</sup> Within this spectrum, the key factors were the foundation of the concept of architecture as a science, and the formulation of an aesthetic world view that could be realised with the help of architecture. There are two relevant perspectives here. They are, first, of a practical and propaedeutic character and, secondly, of a systematic and scientific character. The practical and propaedeutic perspective relates to the moral education of architects, and their ethos as authors of works that

c. ‘Wissenschaftlich’; ‘mächtiges Bildungsmittel’. Cited after Peter Burke, *Circa 1808: Restructuring Knowledges / Um 1808: Neuordnung der Wissensarten* (Berlin and Munich: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2008), 52f.

will have an effect on human aesthetic culture. Here the emphasis is on the formation of character. From the systematic and scientific perspective, the important factor was the epistemological, aesthetic and religio-philosophical grounding of a concept of architecture, which in turn was to serve as the justification of an aesthetic programme. Both perspectives complemented one another. In other words, philosophy served under both headings as the general foundation for specific architectural schemes. In the remainder of this chapter, the influence of this form of German Idealist philosophy on the architecture of the nineteenth century will be illustrated by Klenze's use of Schelling and of the concept of the organism.

## II.

Klenze wrote in 1822: 'The tonic and plastic arts [are associated] in their first and highest emotive meaning . . . with religious objectives.'<sup>d</sup> His main architectural concern was therefore with the architecture of the Christian cult. He was able to use the concept of organism as a foundation for his practice as an architect in this respect. Klenze does not give a precise definition of the 'organism', but in the works to be cited he gives different specific linguistic forms to the concept. If these different examples are reduced to their shared basic structure, it is possible to follow Rudolf Wiegmann (1804–65) in abstracting from them a fundamental unity behind these individual examples, which shows that according to Klenze, 'any organism can only exist through the reciprocal determination, active union and mutual relationship between its constituent parts'.<sup>e,17</sup> This definition of the 'organism' as a living whole appears in a letter from Klenze to King Ludwig I, of 31 December 1820, concerning the designs for the Valhalla memorial. He wrote there: 'but therefore you cannot deal with it like a polyp, which you can twist and turn about in any direction without dislocation, and from which you can cut off any particular limbs you like without doing any damage to the rest of the organism or its vitality'.<sup>f</sup> As we shall see, Klenze gives concrete

d. 'Die tonischen so wie die plastischen Künste [gehören] in ihrer ersten und höchsten pathetischen Bedeutung . . . religiösen Zwecken . . . an.' Leo von Klenze, *Philosophie*, BSTB (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek) Klenzeana, ii, 8, 35.

e. 'Jeder Organismus nur in der wechselseitigen Bedingtheit, in der lebendigen Verbindung und gegenseitigen Bezüglichkeit der ihn constituierenden Glieder bestehen kann.' Rudolf Wiegmann, *Der Ritter Leo von Klenze und unsere Kunst* (Düsseldorf: Schreiner, 1839), 47.

f. ' . . . aber deshalb lässt sich nicht wie mit einem Polypen damit umgehen, welcher sich nach allen Seiten drehen und wenden lässt, ohne sich zu verrenken, und dem man die einzelnen Glieder nach Belieben abschneiden kann ohne seinem halben Leben und Organismus Schaden zu thun'. GHA, *Nachlaß Ludwigs I.* (Geheimes Hausarchiv der Wittelsbacher, Abteilung iii, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich), i A 36, 1.

form to this general schema of the ‘organism’ in functional, constructive, historical, anthropological and philosophical terms. Since his primary concern in architecture had the sacral character we have mentioned, he defined it by appealing to aspects of the concept of the ‘organism’, all of which had reference to the Absolute. These were autonomy, wholeness, completeness, permanence, truth and vitality. From these, according to Klenze, it had to be possible to deduce ‘the formula in which, as it were, divinity has enshrined the “Fundamental Law of Architecture”’.<sup>g</sup>

Klenze advocated this view not only in his *Guide to the Architecture of the Christian Religion*,<sup>18</sup> in *Studies and Excerpts as Thoughts on the Emergence, History and Rules of Architecture*,<sup>19</sup> in the *Architectural Responses and Essays on my Greek and non-Greek Architecture* (sections I and II),<sup>20</sup> in the *Aphoristic Comments*, compiled during his journey to Greece (1838),<sup>21</sup> and in the *Attempt to Reconstruct the Tuscan Temple according to its Historic and Technical Analogues* (1821),<sup>22</sup> but also – and with particular explicitness – in his study, *Philosophy*.<sup>23</sup>

This piece was in accord with the contemporary interdisciplinary discussion of architectural theory, which ascribed to philosophy, because of its uniquely abstract and non-purposive mode of thought, the task of demonstrating the basis of concrete and particular knowledge in a universal principle: this was a task that, according to Klenze, architecture as a concrete discipline had not performed, but that was urgently needed in order that the ‘formula’ of the architecture of Christianity should first of all (methodologically) be deduced, and then (normatively) be declared universally valid. To this end, according to Klenze’s *Guide to the Architecture of the Christian Religion*, it is necessary to refer to the ‘universal laws of the philosophy of art’.<sup>h</sup> As already mentioned, there are numerous contemporary examples of this connection between architecture and philosophy, and with a similar purpose – one of the most prominent in the German-speaking world is surely the relationship between Schinkel and Fichte.<sup>24</sup> Klenze, on the other hand, found his philosophical authority in a follower of Fichte’s: in Schelling.

Klenze’s attempt to legitimise his concept of organism through Schelling had both internal and external motives. From the disciplinary and normative perspective, he wanted, like Friedrich Gilly before him, to raise architecture to the rank of a fine art, something that had generally been denied it because of its material and mechanical limitations. For only free art is fine art, and

g. ‘Formel gleichsam worin die Gottheit das “Grundgesetz der Architektur” eingeschlossen ha[t].’ Leo von Klenze, *Versuch einer Wiederherstellung des toskanischen Tempels nach seinen historischen und technischen Analogien* (Munich: Finsterlin, 1921).

h. ‘Formel’; ‘allgemeinen Gesetze der Kunstphilosophie’. Leo von Klenze, *Anweisung zur Architectur des christlichen Cultus* (Munich, 1822, reprinted Saarbrücken: Oekonomie Verlag Dr. Müller e.K., 2006), v.

Klenze needed this element of freedom in order to be able to define architecture as an unconstrained instrument of religious culture, which in turn was to be understood as ethical self-education. In respect of method, this was to be achieved by deducing the formal and material presuppositions of the crucial concept of the organism, as used in a science of Christian architecture, from a fundamental principle of the theory of architecture which philosophy was to help to set up.<sup>25</sup> From the religio-philosophical perspective, he wanted to establish a particular understanding of Christianity, as well as to find an appropriate form of expression for Christian architecture, which he could see as justifying an architectural style for Christian worship modelled on the Greek. To establish an aesthetic foundation for religious practice as architecture, he deployed a synthesis of antiquity and Christianity. He drew an analogy between classical architecture and the sculptural expression of polytheism in anthropomorphous statues of gods based on Greek mythology.<sup>26</sup> Klenze thus proved himself to be a ‘confirmed Hellenist’.<sup>i</sup> For him, the ‘inner spirit [of] Greek religion’ was so close to ‘Christianity’ that ‘the liturgical necessities of both can be satisfied in one and the same architectural fashion’.<sup>j</sup> The opponents of this notion included, among others, Johann David Passavant (1787–1861), who stated in his *Thoughts on the Visual Arts and the Depiction of their Progress in Tuscany* (1820)<sup>27</sup> that Greek architecture had a heathen source and was therefore inappropriate for the design of Christian churches.

Taken together, the two perspectives on the concept of the organism – the normative and disciplinary, and the religious and philosophical – constitute for Klenze the essential requirements for the architecture of Christianity. For, on the one hand, the external demands on Christian architecture to explain itself to the secular world required a ‘formula . . . in which divinity’ could enshrine ‘the fundamental law of architecture’ almost as an ‘eternal . . . rule’, while, on the other hand, without actual aesthetic practice, Christianity’s internal task of providing an ultimate justification, in its own terms, for this ‘eternal rule’<sup>k</sup> would not emerge from the abstractness of mere theory into the concrete reality of life.

- i. ‘Eingefleischter Hellenist’. Adrian von Buttlar: ‘Es gibt nur eine Baukunst? Leo von Klenze zwischen Widerstand und Anpassung’, in W. Nerdinger (ed.), *Restaurierung und Romantik, Architektur in Bayern zur Zeit Ludwigs I.: 1825–1848*, Exhibition 27 February – 24 May 1987, Stadtmuseum München (Munich: Heinrich Hugendubel, 1987), 105–17, at 108.
- j. ‘Innere Geist [der] griechischen Religion’ dem ‘Christenthume’; ‘beyder lithurgische Bedürfnisse auf ein und demselben architektonischen Wege befriedigt werden konnten’. Klenze, *Anweisung*, 3.
- k. ‘Formel . . . worin die Gottheit’; ‘das Grundgesetz der Architektur’; ‘ewige . . . Regel’; ‘eingeschlossen hätte’; ‘ewigen Regel’. Leo von Klenze, *Der Tempel des olympischen Jupiter zu Agrigent, nach den neuesten Ausgrabungen dargestellt* (Munich: Cotta, 1821), 3.

In contrast to the high status thus accorded to the concept of the organism in Klenze's understanding of architecture, the two perspectives in which he wishes to see it are under-theorised. Throughout his life Klenze kept himself informed about the archaeological and religio-historical aspects of architectural research, but, despite his own statements to the contrary, he did not develop any consistent architectural theory on the basis of an aesthetic from which these perspectives on the concept of the organism could have been rigorously deduced.<sup>28</sup> His *Philosophy* is an unpublished fragment. He thus never formulated his intended 'fundamental law' of the architecture of the Christian cult. In order to discover its constitutive elements, it is necessary to assemble disparate passages from his other works. In addition to this, Klenze had to defend himself against accusations from colleagues who took a similar view to Passavant and, like Rudolf Wiegmann (1804–65) and Franz Kugler (1808–58), accused him of atheism because his understanding of Christian architecture ultimately implied parallels between Greek mystery cults and the monotheistic Christian religion. While Wiegmann spoke of the 'alluring but dangerous conclusions of [Klenze's] eccentric philosophy of art', which lacked 'any clear understanding of Christianity – with all due respect, an ordinary human intellect could not understand any of it',<sup>l</sup> Kugler specified the Christological problem as the neglect of the eschatological meaning of Christianity: 'any educated Christian knows that in the crucial respect of redemption, the inner spirit of Christianity is as wholly unrelated to earlier religions as Heaven is distant from Earth'.<sup>m</sup> Kugler objects to Klenze that, by comparing Christianity with Greek religion, he has reduced it to worldly relationships, and has thus deprived it of its essential meaning – that is to say, he has robbed it of its dimension of salvation history and its relationship with the transcendental world.

In order, despite these objections, to maintain the authority of architecture as an autonomous art form, and to be able to affirm it as a valid instrument for the nurturing of the Christian religion, Klenze, in expounding his concept of 'organism', appealed to Schelling, for whom he felt the

l. 'Gleißenden, aber heillosen Ergebnisse[n] [Klenzes] verschrobene[r] Kunstphilosophie'; 'einen einigermaßen klaren Begriff von Christentum [vermisst . . . ] allen Respekt davor aber ein gewöhnlicher Menschenverstand begreift nichts davon.' Wiegmann, *Der Ritter Leo von Klenze*, 10 and 33f.

m. 'Ein jeder gebildete Christ weiß, dass in dem wichtigsten Punkte, in dem der Erlösung, der innere Geist des Christentums so außer aller Beziehung zu früheren Religionen steht, wie der Himmel entfernt ist von der Erde.' Franz Kugler, *Kleine Schriften über Neuere Kunst und deren Angelegenheiten* (Stuttgart: Ebner & Seubert, 1854), 88.

‘most extraordinary esteem’.<sup>n</sup> In his discussion of the philosopher, who admitted the concept of ‘organism’ only in application to sculpture, but not to architecture, Klenze wanted to show how the term ‘organism’ could also be transferred to classical architecture, so that architecture could be understood as ‘constructive sculpture’,<sup>o</sup> and thus as fine art. Klenze sought to ground this attempt by reframing Schelling’s interpretation of Plato, which he combined with various different – and chronologically widely separate – approaches in architectural history: Vitruvius (c. 70 BC), Cesare Cesariano (1475–1543) and Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand (1760–1834). The method might be labelled eclectic, but it is certainly original. Although in this respect Klenze used Schelling as a starting point for an independent position of his own, he was also the sole authority for his claim that Greek architecture was the only possible form of Christian architecture. In 1838, he turned to Schelling because he ‘had blundered into a discussion which was based on an immovable conviction, but which nevertheless led to difficult and tangled paths upon which it is easy to stray into error. I appeal to you, sir, to tell me whether I am [right] in this case.’<sup>p</sup> Schelling in his answer agreed with Klenze that antiquity had fallen into disrepute because of ‘uninspired, purely superficial and formal imitation’ of it:

instead of immersion in the spiritual approach through which such works came into being. Nowadays this superficially conceived opposition between paganism and Christianity is being exploited to reject any relationship between ancient and modern art. But it seems to me that Christian art would be in a very different situation if it first sought to recognize the profundity which the Greeks attained in their works, and then attempted to reach something equivalent or at least similar.<sup>q,29</sup>

n. ‘Ausgezeichnetste Hochachtung’. Klenze to Schelling, 14 May 1836. AAdW (Archiv der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften), Schellingnachlaß, No. 390.

o. ‘Konstruktive Plastik’. Dirk Klose, *Klassizismus als idealistische Weltanschauung. Leo von Klenze als Kunstphilosoph* (Munich: Kommissionsverlag Uni-Druck, 1999), 93.

p. ‘In eine Diskussion hineingerathen [sei], welche zwar auf unumstößlicher Überzeugung beruht, jedoch auf schwierige und verwickelte Pfade führt, auf welchen man sich leicht verirren kann. Ich bitte Ew. Hochwohlgebohren mir zu sagen, ob ich in diesem Falle [richtig] bin.’ Klenze to Schelling, 14 May 1836. AAdW, Schellingnachlaß No. 390.

q. ‘Geistlosen, bloß äußerlichen und formellen Nachahmung’; ‘anstatt in die geistige Methode selbst einzudringen, durch die solche Werke entstanden. Jetzt muß der oberflächlich verstandene Gegensatz zwischen Heidentum und Christentum sich dafür brauchen lassen, zwischen antiker und moderner Kunst jede Beziehung abzuweisen. Mir aber scheint, dass es um die christliche Kunst ganz anders stehen würde, wenn sie die Tiefe vorerst nur zu erkennen suchte, in welche die griechische mit ihren Gegenständen hinabgestiegen ist und wenn sie dann



In agreement with Schelling, Klenze tentatively set about reconstructing the history of architecture on the basis of a history of mythology and a philosophy of history.

Thanks to his training at the Berlin Academy of Architecture under Alois Hirt (1759–1837), Klenze, unlike Schinkel, never freed himself from the standard contemporary belief in the superiority of Greek architecture to all other styles. In his *Journal*, he wrote: ‘My whole-hearted praise of antiquity is quite understandable – and no one has more right than I to say so, I whose opinion on this point has never wavered and will never! never! change.’<sup>27</sup> Klenze may be accused of a certain over-confidence, but not – despite his at times wilful adaptation of Schelling’s ideas on mythology – of paganising architecture.

Accordingly, our account of Klenze’s understanding of Schelling is divided into two sections. The first is devoted to expounding his notion of the work of architecture as organic, which is to say, as a living whole. The second shows how this understanding of architecture is linked to society through the concept of the organism, which functioned for the Romantics as a metaphor for an aesthetic and sociopolitical Utopia,<sup>30</sup> history being understood as a process within a living, constantly developing whole underpinned by an Absolute that is – like architecture – always realising itself in new forms. Some concluding remarks take up the idea of architecture as a bearer of meaning, connect it once again with the concept of ‘organism’, and, taking the example of Frank Lloyd Wright’s (1867–1959) familiarity with Schelling, acquired through the American Transcendentalist, Ralph Waldo Emerson (1867–1959), show how the philosophy of German Idealism can also be traced in recent architecture.

## II.1

The question of whether, and how far, architecture is an organic, that is to say autonomous and ‘fine’, art or falls instead under the heading of ‘mechanical’ art (i.e., technical craftsmanship) may be extrapolated from the writings of prominent thinkers of Klenze’s time. These include, for example, Karl Philipp Moritz, *On the Formative Emulation of What is Beautiful* (1788);<sup>31</sup>

mit den ihrigen eine gleiche oder doch ähnliche zu erreichen sich bemühte.’ Schelling to Klenze, 15 May 1836, BSTB Klenzeana ii/19.

r. ‘Daß Ich in dieses Lob der Antike vom ganzen Herzen einstimme, ist wohl begreiflich: und Niemand mehr als ich hat das Recht dazu, ich dessen Ansichten über diesen Punkt nie geschwankt haben und nie! nie! wechseln werden.’ Klenze, *Tagebuchaufzeichnungen 1826–43*, BSTB Klenzeana, xiii, 1.

Johann Joachim Winckelmann, *History of Ancient Art* (1763);<sup>32</sup> August Wilhelm Schlegel, *The Theory of Art* (1801–4);<sup>33</sup> and Schelling, *Philosophy of Art* (1802–3).<sup>34</sup> All these writers agreed that they associated their understanding of the concept of the organic in the realm of the visual arts exclusively with sculpture, and not with architecture. At most, architecture was allowed to be partially organic, and thus disqualified from the system of fine art. In order to explain this negative perception of architecture, it is necessary to return to the paradigmatic definition of the organic as formulated by Moritz, and then to reconstruct the strategy established by Klenze in debate with Schelling, through which he wished to free from pure functionality the aspects of architecture that seemed to be contradictory to the autonomy of fine art – that is to say, regularity, necessity, purposefulness, utility and predictability.

Moritz states that:

Every part of a whole must thus itself have a greater or lesser relationship with the whole, whereas the whole when regarded as a whole requires no further relationship with anything outside itself. From this, we can therefore see that in order for something to seem without purpose, it must be an autonomous whole, and that therefore the concept of an autonomous whole is inextricably connected with the concept of what is beautiful.<sup>5</sup>

From this definition there follows an interpretation of the ‘organism’ as an ‘entity . . . in which, just as in a cell of the body, there is inscribed the purpose and idea of the whole’.<sup>35</sup> The organism is a living whole, in which every part is an expression of the whole. It is an end in itself. In opposition to this, there are the non-organic forms, those whose parts neither directly nor indirectly contain information about the whole, for which they play only an external part. They do not exist through and for themselves, but are dependent on their function. Thus, they are directed towards an external objective, like the mechanism of a machine, in which inanimate parts can be replaced as necessary. The organism represents fine art; the non-organic object represents an art based upon utility, which at best can be classified as a partially organic art.

s. ‘Jeder Theil eines Ganzen muß auf diese Weise mehr oder weniger Beziehung auf das ganze selbst haben, das Ganze als Ganzes betrachtet hingegen braucht weiter keine Beziehung auf irgendetwas außer sich zu haben. Hieraus sehen wir also, daß eine Sache um nicht nützlich seyn zu dürfen, nothwendig ein für sich bestehendes Ganzes seyn müsse und daß also mit dem Begriff des Schönen der Begriff von einem für sich bestehenden Ganzen unzertrennlich verknüpft ist.’ Karl Philipp Moritz, *Über die bildende Nachahmung des Schönen* (Braunschweig: Schul-Buchhandlung, 1788), 16.

Schelling understood architecture as a partially organic art, as he stated in his *Philosophy of Art*, referring to Schlegel's Berlin lectures *On Art and Literature* (1801–4):<sup>36</sup> since 'architecture is however nothing more . . . than a return of sculpture to the inorganic', and since architecture 'has to do with dead materials, it must primarily build geometrically and mechanically – that is what constitutes architectural correctness', which 'is discarded only at the higher levels', which are marked by the use of 'a freer ornamentation'.<sup>t</sup>

In speaking of inorganic geometric forms, Schelling is alluding to Plato, who wrote in the *Timaeus* that the forms of the primordial 'elements' of the structure of the world were:<sup>37</sup> fire and the tetrahedron, water and the icosahedron, earth and the cube, air and the octahedron, together with the harmonious cosmos itself and the dodecahedron.<sup>38</sup> Organic art had to animate these geometric relationships. Schelling compared these Platonic bodies with the Greek gods. 'The gods . . . do not live a dependent and conditional life, but a free and independent one. Though particular individuals, they enjoy the bliss of the absolute', and that is 'a state which can only be exemplified by the heavenly bodies, which are the original sensual images of the gods'.<sup>u</sup> It was not least because of this parallel that he felt that sculpture was superior to architecture. Although classical architecture, with its geometric use of forms, recalled Platonic bodies, in the complex and subtly moulded sculptures of gods in human form this inorganic geometry was intensified into an image of a living organism. For the Greek gods together formed an organic whole that could be understood as a manifestation of the universal interconnectedness of humanity. The sculptures therefore did not represent human individuals, but gave the Absolute concrete form – that is to say, they are 'the Absolute itself, viewed tangibly'.<sup>v</sup> The formal analogy between classical architecture and the anthropomorphic body – reminiscent of the Vitruvian analogy between Doric and Ionic columns and the male and female bodies<sup>39</sup> – seemed to Schelling to be only the first stage of a development, which was perfected in the organic sculpture of the Greek pantheon.

t. 'Aber die Architektur nichts anderes . . . als ein Zurückgehen der Plastik zum Anorganischen [ist]'; 'es mit toten Materien zu tun hat, so muß sie zuvörderst geometrisch und mechanisch bauen, darin besteht die architektonische Richtigkeit'; 'erst auf den höheren Stufen abgeworfen wird'; 'eine freiere Ausschmückung'. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *Schellings sämtliche Werke*, ed. Karl Friedrich August Schelling, 14 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856–61), (hereafter SSW), Abt. i, 5, 144.

u. 'Die Götter . . . leben eben . . . kein abhängiges und bedingtes, sondern ein freies und unabhängiges Leben, sie genießen als besondere gleichwohl die Seligkeit des Absoluten'; 'ein Verhältnis, wovon nur etwa an den Weltkörpern, als den ersten sinnlichen Bildern der Götter ein Beispiel'. SSW, i, 5, 397.

v. 'Das Absolute selbst im Besonderen . . . real angeschaut'. SSW, i, 5, 398.

Reacting critically, and in the light of the concept of ‘organism’, to this definition of the relationship between architecture and sculpture, Klenze based his debate with Schelling on the concepts of *pathos* and *ethos*, borrowed from Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric. While Klenze understood *ethos* entirely in Durand’s sense, as the function of architecture as practicality for human use,<sup>40</sup> he conceived of *pathos*, in accordance with Plato’s doctrine of ideas and their embodiment in *Phaedrus* (370–360 BC), as a preconscious, prophetic or retrospective sense of beauty, through which the passive (i.e., receptive) artistic genius has a part in the transcendental world, and, thus inspired, becomes correspondingly productive of art.

Klenze’s idea was that architecture, currently defined as partly organic on the basis of its combination of function and idea or of *ethos* and *pathos*, could be raised to the status of a fully organic art on the premise that function and *ethos* were merely determinant of the particular form of the art of architecture, rather than its principle. His argument appeals to architecture’s phenomenological status. For Klenze, Schelling’s concept of architecture as a utilitarian art means that it is therefore a fine, or organic, art, because architecture ‘does not simply insert an imprint or picture of the universe and the absolute into this particular form, but is itself the absolute. So with regard to architecture, functionality is simply the form of its appearing, not its essence. By making form and essence become one, by making this form based upon utility also become a form of beauty, architecture is elevated to a fine and organic art.’<sup>w</sup>

Klenze’s starting point was Greek pantheism, which was reflected in the heroic (Doric), masculine (Ionic) and feminine (Corinthian) architectural orders. He felt that the ‘anthropomorphic characters’<sup>x</sup> of the Greek orders were formed by the *pathos* of artistic genius. In this way, he felt, architecture participated as legitimately in the cosmic world of Ideas as, according to Schelling, did the sculptures of the Greek gods. In order to elevate architecture from the partially organic status to that of the fully organic, Klenze, in his fragmentary *Philosophy*, intensified the anthropological element by including within the cosmic sphere of *pathos* the geometric, constructive and functional aspects of classical architecture, which he had conceived of

w. ‘Nicht nur in diese Form den Abdruck oder das Bild des Universums und des Absoluten legt, sondern das Absolute selbst ist. So ist in Ansehung der Architektur eben nur die Zweckmäßigkeit die Form der Erscheinung, nicht aber das Wesen, und in dem Verhältnis, in welchem sie Form und Wesen eines macht, in welchem sie diese Form, die an sich auf Nützlichkeit geht, zugleich zur Form der Schönheit macht, in dem Verhältnis erhebt sie sich zur schönen und organischen Kunst.’ SSW, i, 5, 575.

x. ‘Anthropomorphen Charaktere’. Leo von Klenze, *Bau der Glyptothek*, BSTB Klenzeana, iii, 6, 47.

as belonging to *ethos*, that is, the earthly world. Conversely, in *Responses II*, using the concepts of ‘body’ and ‘function’, he draws an analogy between the geometrical and Platonic solids in classical architecture and the forms of the human body – or, put abstractly: an analogy between function and Idea.

He writes in *Philosophy*, with reference to Plato’s *Timaeus*: ‘The concept of physical beauty [is] established as the first spatial concept in the very earliest epoch of knowledge, and [it] arises from the memory of earlier visions of divine perfection.’<sup>y</sup> For Klenze, therefore, physical beauty is the link between the earthly and the transcendental world. Physical beauty is, ‘according to Plato, the original Idea of things in God, or the rule according to which supreme perfection and functionality were originally clothed in form and matter, and in memory continue to appeal in an infinite and always harmonious diversity.’<sup>z</sup> In his interpretation of Plato, ‘the principle of physical beauty as a harmony of function and form has its basis in nature’.<sup>aa</sup>

In *Responses II*, Klenze gives concrete substance to his anthropological concept of physical beauty through reference to his geometrical premises. He refers to Vitruvius’ sketch of the ideal body, in which a man with outstretched arms and legs stands in both a circle and a square. Along with curved, vertical and horizontal lines and measurements, the sketch also contains the diagonal and its corresponding geometrical form of the triangle. The latter do not appear in Vitruvius himself, but in Cesariano’s edition of 1521, with which Klenze was familiar.<sup>41</sup> Hence, for him classical architecture reflected the divine cosmos not just through the anthropological similarity of columns to the human body, but primarily because of the abstract geometry on which the human body was constructed. Thus, architecture seemed to Klenze – in contrast to Schelling – not only partly, but fully organic.

## II.2

Klenze thus claims to have provided a basis for recognising architecture as a fully valid ethical and religious instrument in the process of civilisation. Next he needs to defend his use of religious terms borrowed from Greek antiquity

y. ‘Der Begriff von Körperschönheit als der erste räumliche schon in der allerältesten Epoche der Erkenntnis begründet, und aus der Erinnerung früherer Anschauung göttlicher Vollkommenheit hervorgegangen.’ Klenze, *Philosophie*, ii, 8, 19f.

z. ‘Nach Plato die ursprüngliche Idee der Dinge in Gott, das heißt die Regel nach welcher die höchste Vollkommenheit und Zweckmäßigkeit ursprünglich in Materie und Gestalt gekleidet werden, und aus der Erinnerung in unendlicher und stets harmonischer Mannigfaltigkeit wieder anspricht’, *Ibid.*

aa. ‘Das Gesetz körperlicher Schönheit als Harmonie des Zwecks mit der Form in der Natur . . . begründet’, *Ibid.*

against the charge of atheism, in order to be able to justify treating the style of Greek antiquity as the only proper style for Christian architecture. Schelling's philosophy of history serves as his starting point.

For this purpose, in his *Guide to the Architecture of the Christian Religion*, Klenze contrasts mysteries with mythology, as well as secret cults with revealed religion. He is first of all concerned with the differences between different perceptions of the divine Idea. In the sphere of the mysteries Ideas are mental objects. Given this status, they are non-sensible, and are comprehensible only to initiates. In mythology, on the other hand, ideas are comprehensible to ordinary humanity on a symbolic level through the medium of rites and customs. Klenze wants to demonstrate that the essence of a secret cult can be part of everyday reality. This presupposes that the Ideas become applicable to real life, which they do by manifesting themselves as concrete divinities. Gods with earthly features, made real in this way, are the foundations of religion. Here Klenze is in agreement with the contemporary interest in a 'new mythology',<sup>42</sup> in which what is internal, that is, the ancient mysteries – such as the 'doctrine of emanation' or the 'Eleusinian rites'<sup>43</sup> – is to become external. While philosophy deals with the realm of ideas as internal, their external expression is popular religious practice, in the customs of which the esoteric becomes exoteric. He sees this relationship between what is internal and what is external above all in Greek art. It is the foundation of his concept of religion and the reason for his preference for the Greek style.

While in Greek religion a direct unity of the finite and the infinite is achieved in architecture and sculpture through the 'humanisation of the gods', the relationship in Christianity is indirect. It is 'only the *path* to perfection'.<sup>bb</sup> Christianity is therefore a propaedeutic 'for the true Gospel',<sup>cc</sup> which, according to Klenze, is realised in religious practice through the medium of symbols. Along with Schelling, Klenze feels that the 'symbols of Christianity' are intended to represent 'in images, the identity of God with the world', since 'the peculiarly Christian attitude is the vision of God in the finite'.<sup>dd</sup> Like the philosopher he understands this vision as mysticism,<sup>44</sup> which is only seemingly opposed to revealed religion. Revealed religion is by its nature a perpetually evolving religion. Given Christianity's characteristic trust in the future, what is esoteric about the religion is openly shown to its followers through symbols. Christianity is therefore similar to Ancient Greek religion, since from its beginnings there has been a unity between

bb. 'Vermenschlichung der Götter'; 'nur der Weg zur Vollendung'. SSW, i, 5, 120

cc. 'Wahre[n] Evangelium[s]'. SSW, i, 5, 117.

dd. 'Symbole des Christentums'; 'Identität Gottes mit der Welt in Bildern vorzustellen'; 'die dem Christentum eigentümliche Richtung ist die der Anschauung Gottes im Endlichen', *Ibid.*

internality and externality – albeit not given as a fact, as it was for the Greeks, but imposed as a task.

The development towards ‘positive Christianity’ is seen by Klenze as the recognition of mystery as the ‘keystone crowning revelation’. This involves a view of history in which ancient Indian, Nubian, Egyptian, Persian and Greek doctrines are to be considered branches of a worldwide process of religious education, which is fulfilled in ‘the progression of the entire past and present towards [the Christian] moment of salvation’.<sup>ee</sup> Only ‘after all finite forms have been destroyed, and there is nothing left in the whole wide world to unify all humanity through a shared object of sense perception’, will it, for Klenze as for Schelling, be ‘solely the vision of absolute identity in the most completely objective totality that unites humanity once again and for ever in the perfected form of religion’.<sup>ff</sup>

Schelling’s philosophy of history culminates in the notion of a complete union of subject and object, in which in Antiquity objectivity predominated, and which accordingly manifested itself in divinities that were both natural and human. In the modern era, on the other hand, a rationalised intellect has displaced this union into the abstract realm of speculative philosophy. As Idealist Nature Philosophy has demonstrated the presence of the Ideas in nature, it can be presumed that a changed picture of reality will emerge to compensate for the loss of sensuality in the purely speculative consciousness. Schelling identifies this recovered rational and material union as ‘the idea of all ideas’,<sup>gg</sup> and as the ‘return of the gods’.<sup>45</sup>

In this context, Schelling understands the Christ Child as a ‘reborn Dionysus’ – as the ‘last ruler of the world, to whom Greece [was] above all devoted’.<sup>hh</sup> He sees Christ as the last of the gods, for he encapsulates the whole of mythology. In this he includes the Orphic cosmogonies and their doctrine of the epochs of Uranus, Kronos, Zeus and Dionysus. Thus, he links the idea that through, or in, the child Dionysus, the world that had been secularised in the epoch of Kronos could be turned back into the supersensible world.<sup>46</sup> In his observations on ‘Early Religions and their Relationship to Christianity’, Klenze agrees with Schelling that the

ee. ‘Positiven Christentum’; ‘Schlussstein der Offenbarung’; ‘ein Hinwirken der ganzen Vor- und Mitwelt auf [das christliche] Moment der Erlösung’. Klenze, *Anweisung*, 1f.

ff. ‘Nur die Anschauung der absoluten Identität in der vollkommensten objektiven Totalität seyn, die sie aufs Neue und in der letzten Ausbildung der Religion auf ewig vereinigt’. SSW, i, 2, 72f.

gg. ‘Idee aller Ideen’. SSW, i, 5, 390.

hh. ‘Letzten Weltregent[en, dem] vorzüglich Griechenland zugethan’. Manfred Frank, *Der kommende Gott. Vorlesungen über die Neue Mythologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), 311.

‘incarnation of Jesus Christ’, is ‘the culminating insight<sup>iii</sup> of a long religious development.

Klenze, like Schelling, thus demonstrates a dialectical understanding of mythology. He envisages a progression that began with a unity, which, however, was at first inadequate – for example, the monotheism of the Old Testament or the astral cult of the Sabaeans (*Zabismus*). This unity remained incomplete, because its scope was not universal, and it broke apart into a polytheistic multiplicity. At this point mythology began. At the end of the development we find a self-certain unity that reveals itself as such. In the God of this final unity, the previous forms of the divine are sublated. The unity is realised in the birth of the divine child. For Klenze, the ‘appearance of the saviour of the world’ is the ‘purpose of our era’.<sup>jj</sup> He shares with Schelling the conception of the Dionysian as the ‘imminent’ and ‘liberating’<sup>kk</sup> God, who incorporates the eternal potential for the external realisation of mystic internality. It is fundamentally always one and the same God, who reveals himself in different eras and with correspondingly specific characteristics. Schelling thus understands the name of Jehovah, meaning: ‘I will be who I will be’, in a Dionysian sense as the ‘name of the one who is future, who is only now evolving, who will one day be’.<sup>ll</sup> By means of this model of the continuous revelation of the internal through the external and the gradual approximation of the external to the internal, Greek architecture is for Schelling and Klenze shown to be the specifically Christian form of architecture because of its function as an image of this intersection between the esoteric and the exoteric, which in turn is the stimulus for religious practice.

### III.

Klenze’s reception of Schelling and the example of the concept of ‘organism’ show that German Idealism did have an influence both on specific areas of contemporary architectural theory and on the principles of design in practical work. While the understanding of Schelling’s concept of the ‘organism’ as a living whole, and of its relevance to the unity of time and of the religions of the world, was of great importance for Klenze, Frank Lloyd Wright’s reaction to Ralph Waldo Emerson’s concept of organism<sup>47</sup> (which was also informed

ii. ‘Frühere[n] Religionen und ihre[n] Beziehungen zum Christenthume’; ‘Menschwerdung Jesus Christus’; ‘Gipfel der Erkenntnis’. Klenze, *Anweisung*, 1.

jj. ‘Erscheinung des Weltheilands’; ‘Ziel unsrer Weltepoche’, *Ibid.*

kk. ‘Kommende[n]’; ‘befreiende[n]’. SSW, ii, 2, 351.

ll. ‘Ich werde da sein, als der ich da sein werde’; ‘Namen des Zukünftigen, des jetzt nur Werdenden, der einst seyn wird’. SSW, ii, 1, 172.



by German Idealism<sup>48</sup>) shows that certain aspects of Schelling's concept can be related to recent developments in architecture. The essential elements here are geometry and the organic analogy, and the frame of reference is the relationship between nature and culture. Leaving aside the intrinsic differences in how Klenze and Wright understand Schelling's 'organism', the closest similarity between them in their use of the philosopher lies in their recognition of a necessary presupposition for defining the concept in the first place: the principle of a unified totality of life, which differentiates itself into a living multiplicity.

In *Nature* (1836),<sup>49</sup> Emerson developed a mystically informed theory of nature in reaction to Schelling's concept of the 'world-soul' (*On the Soul of the World*, 1798<sup>50</sup>). Emerson prefers to speak of the 'Over-soul'. Following Schelling, he understands it as an organising and unifying principle, that continually links organic and inorganic nature, and so combines the whole of nature into a universal organism.<sup>51</sup> Under the influence of Emerson's *Nature*, according to Robert McCarter,<sup>52</sup> Wright develops a programme of organic architecture that sees nature as God's creation. For him, 'life is a gift from a divine source',<sup>53</sup> and nature is the image of this source. Nature serves him as the impulse, motive and agency for his organic architecture, which he describes as 'sermons in stones'.<sup>54</sup>

In his essay 'In the Cause of Architecture' (1914),<sup>55</sup> Wright defined the organic character of architecture in the following terms: 'I mean an architecture that develops from within outward in harmony with the conditions of its being as distinguished from one that is applied from without.'<sup>56</sup> A living unity, in the sense of a self-perpetuating organism, is the common basis of nature and architecture. Wright's background was Welsh Unitarianism, according to which the 'UNITY of all things'<sup>57</sup> underlies, directs and concludes every quest for understanding. The structuring of the world is held to be immanent, and the natural and the metaphysical spheres are held to be not two separate entities, but one single sphere, so that therefore the supersensible appears in nature. For him, as for Emerson, humanity is part of nature, or at least emerges from it. It is therefore possible to have a pre-conscious intimation of these relationships. In this sense 'truth was in us before it was ever reflected to us from natural objects',<sup>58</sup> but since nature functions as a mirror, we should, according to Emerson, 'esteem nature a perpetual counselor, and her perfections the exact measure of our deviations'.<sup>59</sup>

Wright combines Emerson's Transcendentalist principles with the educational theory of Friedrich Fröbel (1782–1852), a colleague of Pestalozzi.

Fröbel and Wright, like Emerson, advocate ‘reasoning from the seen to the unseen’,<sup>60</sup> by recourse to the geometric forms which – considered in the abstract – constitute the natural world. According to Fröbel, there are what he calls twenty ‘gifts’.<sup>61</sup> These are toys modelled on crystalline structures, with which a child’s spatial awareness and tactile sense could be developed. For Fröbel the key is both the recognition of the basic geometric forms of the objects that constitute the material world, and a training in the awareness that these objects are all determined by these basic geometric forms, and so together form an ‘organic unity’.<sup>62</sup> For Wright as an architect, this means that he does not focus on the material and ornamental parts of nature as a model for architectural forms, but on the geometry underlying all existence.

This entirely pure and utilitarian geometry is not only the formal criterion of Wright’s architecture, but, most importantly, it is its moral basis. The circle stands for infinity; the triangle for structural unity; the tower for desire; the spiral for organic process and the square for integrity. Neglecting these forms has serious consequences. According to Wright, ‘architectural sins are permanent’,<sup>63</sup> because architecture – like no other form of art – reaches into and affects all aspects of human life. Therefore, Wright felt that engagement with the geometrically constituted organic whole was far more than a formal tool in the process of aesthetic composition. It was rather the motivation for his own ideal conception of the world.

*Translated by Mary Boyle*

## Notes

1. Hanno-Walter Kruft, *Geschichte der Architekturtheorie. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart* (Cologne: Taschen, 2004), 331. See also Claude Mignot, *Architektur des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne: Taschen, 1994).
2. David Gilly, *Handbuch der Land-Bau-Kunst* (Berlin: Friedrich Maurer, 1797–1811); D. Gilly, *Sammlung nützlicher Aufsätze* (Berlin: Friedrich Maurer, 1797–1806).
3. Friedrich Gilly, ‘Einige Gedanken über die Nothwendigkeit, die verschiedenen Theile der Baukunst in wissenschaftlicher und praktischer Hinsicht möglichst zu vereinigen’, in *Friedrich Gilly. Essays zur Architektur, 1796–1799*, ed. Fritz Neumeyer (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1997), 178–87.
4. Kruft, *Architekturtheorie*, 336.
5. Johann Heinrich Koosen, *Propädeutik der Kunst* (Königsberg: Tag & Koch, 1847), 215.
6. Christian Ludwig Stieglitz, *Encyklopädie der bürgerlichen Baukunst in welcher alle Fächer dieser Kunst nach alphabetischer Ordnung abgehandelt sind. Ein Handbuch für Staatswirte, Baumeister*

- und Landwirte, 5 vols. (Leipzig: Caspar Fritsch, 1772–98); Johann Georg Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste in einzelnen, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter aufeinander folgenden Artikeln* (Leipzig: M. G. Weidmanns Erben & Reich, 1771–4). Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Solger is an exception. He inverts the hierarchy of the arts as usually formulated in the contemporary systems. The other arts only have ‘their meaning’ ‘in relation’ to architecture. Compare Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Solger, *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik*, ed. Karl Wilhelm Ludwig Heyse (Leipzig: Brockhaus 1829, reprinted Darmstadt, 1980), 345.
7. Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, ‘Neuer Begriff der Baukunst als schoener Kunst’, *Deutsche Monatschrift*, 3, H. 10, 160–4.
  8. Peter Burke, *Circa 1808: Restructuring Knowledges / Um 1808: Neuordnung der Wissensarten* (Berlin and Munich: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2008), 29.
  9. *Ibid.*, 33.
  10. Karl Friedrich Burdach, *Der Organismus menschlicher Wissenschaft und Kunst* (Erlangen: Mitzky, 1809), 36.
  11. Burke, *Circa 1808*, 43.
  12. Larry Shiner, *The Invention of Art: a cultural history* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
  13. Burke, *Circa 1808*, 51.
  14. See Bernhard Lypp (ed.), *Schelling und die Akademie der Bildenden Künste* (Munich: Schlebrügge-Editor, 2002), 69, 77.
  15. Cf. *Ibid.*, 53.
  16. Michael Brix and Monika Steinhauser (eds.), *Geschichte ist allein zeitgemäß. Historismus in Deutschland* (Lahn-Gießen: Anabas Verlag Kampf, 1987).
  17. See also Leo von Klenze, *Philosophie*, BSTB (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek) Klenzeana, ii, 8, 19.
  18. Leo von Klenze, *Anweisung zur Architectur des christlichen Cultus* (Munich, 1822, reprinted Saarbrücken: Oekonomie Verlag Dr. Müller e.K., 2006).
  19. Leo von Klenze, *Studien und Excerpte als Gedanken über Entstehen, Geschichte und Regeln der Architectur von 1809 bis . . .*, BSTB Klenzeana, ii, 4.
  20. Leo von Klenze, *Architektonische Erwiederungen und Erörterungen über Griechisches und Nichtgriechisches von meiner Architektur*, BSTB, Klenzeana I, 9, 11a.
  21. Leo von Klenze, *Aphoristische Bemerkungen, gesammelt auf seiner Reise nach Griechenland* (Berlin: Reimer, 1838).
  22. Klenze, *Versuch einer Wiederherstellung des toskanischen Tempels nach seinen historischen und technischen Analogien* (Munich: Finsterlin, 1921).
  23. Klenze, *Philosophie*, ii, 8.
  24. Compare Petra Lohmann, *Architektur als Symbol des Lebens. Zur Wirkung der Philosophie Johann Gottlieb Fichtes auf die Architekturtheorie Karl Friedrich Schinkels (1803–1815)* (Berlin: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2010).
  25. Leo von Klenze, *Sammlung Architektonischer Entwürfe für die Ausführung bestimmt oder wirklich ausgeführt (1830–50)* (Munich: Cotta, 1830), Issue 1, Foreword.
  26. Compare Dirk Klose, *Klassizismus als idealistische Weltanschauung. Leo von Klenze als Kunstphilosoph* (Munich: Kommissionsverlag Uni-Druck, 1999), 81.

27. Johann David Passavant, *Ansichten über die bildenden Künste und Darstellung des Ganges derselben in Toscana, Heidelberg und Speyer* (Heidelberg: August Oswald's Buchhandlung, 1820).
28. Cf. Klose, *Klassizismus als idealistische Weltanschauung*, 75–95.
29. See Klose, *Klassizismus als idealistische Weltanschauung*, 15.
30. Manfred Frank, *Der kommende Gott. Vorlesungen über die Neue Mythologie* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1982), 156.
31. Karl Philipp Moritz, *Über die bildende Nachahmung des Schönen* (Braunschweig: Schul-Buchhandlung, 1788).
32. Johann Joachim Winckelmann, *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums* (1763) (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993, reprint of 1964 edition).
33. August Wilhelm Schlegel, *Die Kunstlehre*, in *Kritische Schriften und Briefe*, ed. E. Lohner, 7 vols. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963), II.
34. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst*, in Karl Friedrich August Schelling (ed.), *Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Schellings sämtliche Werke*, 14 vols., Abt. I, 5 (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856–61) [hereafter SSW].
35. Frank, *Gott*, 155.
36. In Schlegel, *Kunstlehre*, 140–57.
37. Plato, *Timaeus*, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 1151–1211.
38. *Ibid.*, 1181.
39. *The Architecture of Marcus Vitruvius Pollio*, trans. J. Gwilt (London: Weale, 1860), 81–2.
40. Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand, *Précis des leçons d'architecture*, 2 vols. (Nordlingen: Dr. Alfons Uhl, 1986), 4.
41. Klenze, *Erwiederungen*, I, 9, 22.
42. *Ibid.*, 251.
43. Klenze, *Anweisung*, 2.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Frank, *Gott*, 248.
46. Cf. *Ibid.* 249 and 310f.
47. Compare Robert McCarter, *Frank Lloyd Wright* (London: Phaidon, 1997), 13–14.
48. Thomas Krusche, *R. W. Emersons Naturauffassung und ihre philosophischen Ursprünge. Eine Interpretation des Emersonschen Denkens aus dem Blickwinkel des deutschen Idealismus* (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1987), 234f and 215–17.
49. Reprinted in *Essays. Second Series* (Boston: J. Munroe, 1844).
50. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *Von der Weltseele*, in SSW, Abt. I, 9.
51. SSW, I, 2, 596.
52. Compare Ákos Moravánsky, *Architekturtheorie im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine kritische Anthologie* (Vienna: Springer, 2003), 262–5 and McCarter, *Frank Lloyd Wright*, 17, 19 and 22.
53. Quoted McCarter, *Frank Lloyd Wright*, German edition (Munich: DVA, 2010), 18.
54. *Ibid.*, 17.
55. Frank Lloyd Wright, 'In the cause of architecture', in Robert Twombly (ed.), *Frank Lloyd Wright: essential texts* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), 159–85.
56. *Ibid.*, 162.

57. Quoted in McCarter, *Frank Lloyd Wright*, German edition, 18.

58. McCarter, *Frank Lloyd Wright* (London edition), 14.

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*, 12.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*, 14.